


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November 5, 1962

CODIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS ON CUBAN NEGOTIATIONS

(Drawn from Deptels (all to USUN) 1147 of October 31, as amended; 1159 of November 1; 1166 of November 1; 1177 of November 2; and 1189 of November 3)

1

I. General Considerations

Purpose of Negotiation

a. "Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547) the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date." (Deptel 1147 as amended)

Disposition of Wider Issues

b. "9. The President particularly desires that there should be no discussion of wider issues from our side until the offensive weapons in Cuba are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration of tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on this present matter." (Deptel 1159)

Inspection of Removal Operations

c. "Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine Kuznetsov's insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal of Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial

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surveillance and post-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

"While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Need for Additional Check

d. "... I now believe we should not be satisfied, as 1147 suggests, with aerial surveillance and post-removal ground inspection for departing offensive weapons. We must also have some way of verifying the reexport of the missiles, and the best practicable way seems to be to count them on departing ships. This can be done with no violation of Soviet security by reliable and non-technical non-Americans, and we should insist on this or an equally effective verification." (Deptel 1189)

Progress to date (11/3/62), Future Outlook, and Additional Guidance

e. "We have good evidence that the Russians are dismantling the missile bases. We have no decisive evidence of what they will do with this equipment. The assembly of IL-28's continues. There is some evidence of an intent to establish a submarine-tending facility. The future of the SAM sites is unclear. We have no satisfactory assurances on verification. Our aerial surveillance still proceeds without guarantee of safety.

"This crisis is likely to move in one of two major directions in the next few weeks. On the one hand, we may be able to make arrangements which will in fact ensure the verified removal of all Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba and establish reliable safeguards against their reintroduction. This is the object of our policy and it is precisely stated in my letter to Khrushchev of October 27: 'You would agree to remove these weapons systems (previously defined as "all weapons systems

in Cuba

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in Cuba capable of offensive use") from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.' Chairman Khrushchev's message of 28 October contained an explicit undertaking to dismantle, crate and return to the Soviet Union 'the weapons which you describe as "offensive"' under UN verification. It is the position of the United States Government that this is a clear acceptance of my proposal of October 27.

"This requirement means removal of all offensive missiles and supporting equipment, and of all bombers and their equipment....." (Septel 1189)

"f. "In blunt summary, we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28.

"If in fact the Soviet Government executes this kind of removal with the associated and necessary inspection, supervision, and safeguards against reintroduction, then we in turn will hold with equal clarity to the undertaking given in my letter of October 27, as follows: '(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.' We also have an obligation to work with other Western Hemispheric countries to get them to take a similar position. The exact terms and meaning of this undertaking require further work, but its broad implication is clear: in the absence of other provocation or justification, we will give an undertaking not to invade Cuba if we are properly assured that Cuba ceases to be a Soviet military base and ceases to harbor weapons. This commitment in no way derogates from our Hemispheric obligations to deal with aggressive or subversive activities by the present regime in Cuba.

"There is another major course which events may take. It is one with which all who have negotiated with the Soviet Government in the past are familiar. It is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents verification, agreements are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet Government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up.

"There is such

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"There is much evidence to support the conclusion that this is what is now beginning.

"This second line of Soviet conduct is unacceptable to the United States. To prevent it we must make it very clear, at every stage, by both word and act, that the United States Government will not accept a mere gentlemen's agreement relating only to visible missiles on identified launch pads. We must have adequate arrangements for verification and inspection to be sure both that offensive weapons are removed and that no more are introduced. Without them, both surveillance and the quarantine must be continued and both may need to be extended. (This condition does not exclude temporary relaxation of either quarantine or surveillance in return for useful steps toward fully effective arrangements. Such a relaxation is foreseen in connection with our plans for IGCX inspection of certain inbound cargoes.) All the offensive weapons systems, including anything related to a submarine base, must be removed, or we shall have to consider further action of our own to remove them.

"Finally, and most generally, the undertaking of the United States against invasion cannot take effect in any atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty such that the American Government or the American people would lack proper assurance against the existence in Cuba now, or at any future time, of any Soviet military base or offensive weapons. The Soviet Government must recognize that the events of the last three weeks have made it impossible for opinion in this Hemisphere to be satisfied with Soviet assurances alone. Verification is essential if the Governments of the Western Hemisphere are to be able to live with this situation without further action.

"I repeat that this statement of policy should be taken as binding guidance by all who are engaged in the framing of instructions or the conduct of negotiations on this matter. It is of fundamental importance that we speak as one voice and continue to keep it entirely clear to all Soviet representatives that the agreements of October 27 and 28 must be carried out in full -- and that otherwise the United States Government will find

it necessary,

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it necessary to move again by its own means to insure itself against a repetition of the extraordinary act of deception which initiated this crisis. In this situation the Soviet Government has a clear choice between verified removal of all offensive weapons systems and renewed action by the United States. It has no middle choice, and we believe its own interests should lead it to accept the honest and full execution of the Kennedy-Khrushchey agreement, and to see to it that Castro provides the necessary cooperation." (Deptel 1139)

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~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~2. Definition of Offensive WeaponsPresidential Proclamation

a. "The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported to Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23. The list is as follows: surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Komars

b. "Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, including Komar class motor torpedo boats." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Fall Back Position

c. "Suggest you start with wider definition, including a supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Exclusions from Definition - Question of Technicians

d. "Not included in the formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26 that 'the necessity for the presence of [Soviet] military specialists in Cuba would disappear' along with offensive weapons they are manning and protecting." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

e. "8. In addition, you should point out that if Sov missiles and bombers are being removed, there seems no need for Soviets to leave in Cuba equipment and military technicians brought to Cuba primarily to protect the offensive weapons. (note that

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SAM's use missile fuel which is proscribed under quarantine regulations.) President's undertaking against invasion is adequate assurance that these weapons are not needed." (Deptel 1159)

Other Exclusions from Definition

f. "Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

IL-28's

g. "7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27 is clear in covering 'all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use.' This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear acceptance that all of these arms are to be dismantled, crated and returned to the Sov Union (or destroyed). You should seek to elicit a clear confirmation that the IL-28's are included and are being dismantled for removal from Cuba." (Deptel 1159)

h. "1. We must, as set forth para 7 Deptel 1159, tie down Soviets to inclusion of IL-28's among offensive weapons to be removed. Your letter to Mikoyan (USUN 1606) was good move this regard. FYI. As you know, yesterday's reconnaissance was inconclusive on whether Soviets taking any steps to disassemble and crate IL-28's. End FYI." (Deptel 1177)

Submarine Base

i. "These items [offensive weapons] and associated equipment are generally described, in my statement of September 13 and in my address of October 22; they are clearly defined in my Proclamation of October 23. All Americans should stick firmly to this position. We should add that a submarine base is equally unacceptable as Chairman Khrushchev has acknowledged by clear inference in his assurances on the fishing facility." (Deptel 1189)

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3. Initial Two-Phases of Program

Phases in Program

a. "The US envisages multiple phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

"(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn prescribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore, we probably will have to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments." (Deptal 1147, as amended).

b. See para d. in section 1 (General Considerations) for modification of preceding paragraph.

c. "(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. (Deptal 1147, as amended).

d. "This phase would end when SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

e. Third Phase - "Arrangements for the third and final phase relating to commitment of the Soviets not to reintroduce offensive weapons will be covered in subsequent instructions." (Deptal 1147, as amended).

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4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Need for Reconnaissance

a. "Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. One possibility might be aircraft manned by nationals, presumably impartial, designated by UN. Another possibility might be reconnaissance using crews consisting of representatives of the US, Soviet Union, Cuba, and the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

"We recognize that (unlike US) UN would be prepared to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

"We would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Types of Air Reconnaissance

b. "Two types of air surveillance should be considered-- photographic (high and low) and, in phase 1, visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Sources of Crews

c. "The Canadian Government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept not only because SYG will probably not regard Canadians as sufficiently

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sufficiently neutral but also because RF-101 is a military aircraft. Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two to six week period could check out already trained multi-engine air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent C-130 crews which would take only a brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. Australia may therefore also have some capability. The USG is prepared to provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world." (Deptel 1147, as amended).

Substitute Planes

d. "A reasonably satisfactory substitute would be the F-27 which could be modified to provide the necessary high and low photographic capability. Crews experienced with F-27s might be obtained from a number of countries, including Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Modification to incorporate the necessary photographic equipment could be completed in ten days after a decision to employ them." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Processing of Film

e. "Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Need for Development of UN Capability

f. "You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not be tied to US

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cessation of surveillance. Statements that "The United States will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon the effectiveness of UN operations" can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

"It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba." (Deptel 1147, as amended).

Need to Continue US Surveillance and Avoid Firing on US Planes

g. "6. ...although much less satisfactory than UN verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation SOVs and Cuba, US must in elemental interest of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in an unprovokative manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM's, do not require participation of SOV technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might thus face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Soviets immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on." (Deptel 1159).

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5. Incoming Cargoes

Acceptance of ICRC

a. "As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on all ships of whatever flag embarked from Bloc ports. According to our projection, the USSR will need to schedule a total of about 100 ships shortly to arrive in Cuba during the next 3-4 weeks in order to accomplish removal of dismantled equipment. (In addition to 60 ships normally used for offensive equipment, USSR would have to adapt 40 others for purpose). Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will be about equal whether inspection on sea or shore. At sea, less inspectors required per ship because cargo holds cannot be penetrated and surreptitious off-loading not possible but more inspectors in transit shuttling between vessels at sea. In port, transit time eliminated but more inspectors required to watch for surreptitious off-loading and to examine in detail cargo coming out of holds. Because port inspection much more comprehensive, every effort should be made to obtain authorization to inspect in port. Estimate ten personnel needed for each ship entering each port per day. Personnel should be of adequate technical competence to recognize offensive equipment." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

b. "3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels." (Deptel 1157)

Purpose of Inspection

c. "We expect through inspection, including at least selective examination of cargos aboard, to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargos to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Duration of Inspection

d. "We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period enforcement of quarantine would be suspended but US ships would

remain in

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remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Steps in Activating ICRC Inspection

e. "Re Cuba (Urteel 1586), understand from telecon JRC inspection process on high seas can be started soonest. We hope therefore, that ICRC, as executive agent of UN, can begin inspection process forthwith. Subject to views USUN and negotiating group, we believe following steps can be taken by Thant and his staff with a view to getting ICRC inspectors into action soonest.

"1. Believe UN should ask ICRC immediately to name one or more high-level individuals as they desire to come to New York to establish contact and liaison with Secretariat with a view to working out practical arrangements. (Please inform Dept. soonest names such ICRC representatives.)

"2. UN, even before ICRC names such individuals and sends to New York, should through its Geneva office urge ICRC to begin recruitment of small group of inspectors (about 50, qualified to perform inspection of weapons covered by this agreement.

"3. We note that Narasimhan thinking tentatively in terms neutral vessels. We prefer American vessels be used at least in first instance since they are most readily available. FYI Moreover, this more desirable from our viewpoint since crews and communications systems fully reliable. End FYI. You should take this line with Narasimhan and Soviets at first.

"FYI. We recognize that it may not be possible to get agreement to use of American bottoms, although we would seek to minimize any political difficulty by offering ships which are not under US military jurisdiction, i.e., Coast Guard, merchant or

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Geodetic Survey ships. At same time, we are exploring on priority basis possible availability in or close to Caribbean area of neutral ships which might be used for purposes. However, you should not initially indicate this either to Morozov or Narasimhan." (Deptel 1166)

Verification Procedures

f. "Defense has developed following verification procedures.

"1. There would be established on the high seas two check stations:

- a. One station ship in the vicinity of Havans;
- b. One station ship in the vicinity of the Windward Passage.

"2. With respect to the above-mentioned ships, the Soviet Government would give UN Headquarters in New York timely notice of those enroute to Cuba, together with a description of their cargoes.

"3. All such ships would be instructed by the Soviet Union to establish communications with appropriate station ship on 500 KC when within 500 miles of check station. When communications are established, incoming ship would give its name, position, course, speed, estimated time of arrival at check station, and port of destination. The incoming ships would maintain communications with the UN station ship on a radio watch schedule and frequency arranged with that station ship.

"4. Rendezvous time and position would be signaled to incoming ship by UN inspector on board station ship.

"5. The incoming ship would be prepared to receive UN inspectors on arrival at rendezvous. Incoming ship would facilitate such inspection of vessel and cargo as inspectors consider necessary, by opening hatches, holds, and spaces, and by having all papers readily available.

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"6. Each UN

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"6. Each UN inspection team would consist of approximately eight persons, who would be ICRC personnel.

"7. UN would request all nations carrying cargo to Cuba from Bloc ports to comply with the above procedures.

"8. If any ship is found to be carrying offensive weapons, as listed in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23, 1962, the UN inspectors would immediately notify SYG, who we would expect to notify us of this fact." (Deptel 1166)

Need to Inspect Offensive Weapon-Carrying Ships

g. "3. Soviets should understand that, while we are sufficiently satisfied as to character of cargos Soviet vessels now in vicinity quarantine area and therefore willing to permit them to pass under hail procedures of which you have informed Kuznetsov, it would be impossible for us to continue such a procedure for vessels of type that have in past carried offensive weapons and will presumably be required to remove such weapons. Therefore, such vessels should not seek enter quarantine area until ICRC procedures are in effect unless they are prepared to accept US inspection." (Deptel 1177)

Post-Removal Inspection of Incoming Ships

h. "4. President also very much has in mind that his exchange of letters with Khrushchev contemplates that, after completion removal present weapons, continuing arrangements will be required to assure against reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba (see President's letter of October 27 to Khrushchev). If the ICRC arrangement is not kept in place and the Cubans will not cooperate, some other measures will have to be devised. Such measures particularly necessary in view domestic problem USG is prepared to face with respect its undertakings on invasion. Further instructions will be sent you this regard." (Deptel 1177)

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6. Verification of Removal of Offensive Weapons

Phase One Concluding Actions

a. "When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the 'weapons US considers offensive,' a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

"(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba. UN team should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as well as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers and any other area, including storage facilities, where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

"(b) Number of Observers: The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task/^{and} on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists will prefer to keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared to make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number of sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men (in addition to air transport personnel) equipped with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

"(c) Composition: While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to technically trained personnel of genuinely reliable nations which have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For example, we will wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements

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made by their delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Soviet Commitment on Verification

b. "1. Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding based on assumption that Soviets would and could deliver on Khrushchev commitment to remove all offensive weapon systems in Cuba and through UN verification satisfy US and other OAS countries this in fact done and does not recur.

"2. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached and U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov representatives in NY and Cuba to US and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair US regards as essential.

"3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should promptly move to put this in effect with or without Cuba agreement. Further instructions on this will come later today.) US also promptly responded SYG request suspend quarantine and recon flights during period his Havana visit. Also as Sovs aware USC has close watch to prevent anti-Castro Cubans from any action which would upset execution of agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

"4. On question verification USC has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible UN arrangements but there does not yet appear likelihood that even any one of these can be implemented.

"5. President's responsibility for US security demands that in absence UN verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate of this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to US and IA public." (Deptel 1159)

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Possible Alternative to On-Ground Inspection of Removal

c. "2. President considers Khrushchev's commitment to UN verification on the ground as binding and integral part of understanding on which it is Soviet responsibility to deliver or provide substitute acceptable to US. If Soviets not able to carry out this commitment for UN inspection on ground, a less satisfactory but possible alternative might be their making available to ICRC manifests of weapons together with sufficient ICRC inspections of outbound vessels to permit ICRC certify accuracy of such manifests. (Deptel 1177)

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7. Administration and FinanceICRC as Executive Agent

a. "(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent that the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated Deptel 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

Financing of ICRC

b. "(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then US position on financing UN-peace-and-security operations." (Deptel 1147, as amended)

c. "As financing US inspection operation, as indicated Deptel 1147, we prefer that if UN is to foot bill, financing be provided under Section 1(a) of 1961 General Assembly Resolution authorizing SYG make commitments not exceeding 2 million dollars as he certifies related to maintenance peace and security." (Deptel 1166)

d. "Marasimhan's suggestion ICRC assess its members not feasible because ICRC does not have membership which it can assess, but comprises committee of Swiss nationals. Normally ICRC expenses are advanced or reimbursed by interested parties who seek their services for special projects. Soviets are familiar with ICRC financing. Therefore, particularly since they suggested ICRC participation, see no reason why they should object contribute toward ICRC expenses." (Deptel 1166)

Meeting Costs of Vessels

e. "As to costs of vessels, US would be prepared to make appropriate US ships available on non-reimbursable bases." (Deptel 1166)

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3. Invasion Assurances

Conditions of Assurance

a. "If in fact the Soviet Government executes this kind of removal with the assistance and necessary inspection, supervision, and safeguards against reintroduction, then we in turn will hold with equal clarity to the undertaking given in my letter of October 27, as follows: '(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.' We also have an obligation to work with other Western Hemispheric countries to get them to take a similar position. The exact terms and meaning of this undertaking require further work, but its broad implication is clear: in the absence of other provocation or justification, we will give an undertaking not to invade Cuba if we are properly assured that Cuba ceases to be a Soviet military base and ceases to harbor weapons. This commitment in no way derogates from our Hemispheric obligations to deal with aggressive or subversive activities by the present regime in Cuba." (Deptal 1189)

Need to Remove Ambiguity

b. "Finally, and most generally, the undertaking of the United States against invasion cannot take effect in any atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty such that the American Government or the American people would lack proper assurance against the existence in Cuba now, or at any future time, of any Soviet military base or offensive weapons." (Deptal 1189)

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